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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAMDAR & COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND 
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 900539-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF 
JURISDICTION 
This matter was initially appealed to the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
(1953 as amended) in that the appeal was taken from a final order 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court over which the Utah Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. See 
Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. On or about 
November 1, 1990, this matter was assigned to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from an Order of Dismissal for Lack of 
Jurisdiction by the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
The following is the sole issue presented by this appeal, 
expressed in terms and circumstances of the case, but without 
unnecessary detail: 
Whether the Fourth Judicial District Court (the 
"District Court") has specific personal jurisdiction over 
the appellees to resolve a dispute over the payment of fees 
for accounting and financial services rendered by the 
appellants for the benefit of the appellees. These services 
were rendered by the appellant, located in Utah, pursuant to 
an oral contract with the appellees, located in California. 
The appellant performed similar services in Utah for the 
appellees for 18 years. No services were ever performed for 
the appellees by the appellants in California. Instead, for 
over 18 years the appellees would send or otherwise have 
delivered to appellant in Utah all their accounting and 
financial reports, records and other documentation necessary 
for the appellant to perform various accounting services and 
then send the resulting work product to the appellees in 
California. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As a standard of appellate review, this issue is subject to 
review under the "correction of error" standard as the District 
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Court's decision was based solely on the pleadings filed in the 
case and involved no assessment of witness credibility or 
competency. See T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 909 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Thus, this Court is in "as good as position as the 
trial court to examine the evidence de novo and determine the 
facts." In re Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916,918 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF STATUTES 
The interpretation of Utah's Long-Arm Statute may be 
necessary in the resolution of this issue: 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, 
that the public interest demands the state provide its 
citizens with an effective means of redress against 
nonresident persons who, through certain significant minimal 
contacts with the state, incur obligations to citizens 
entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action 
is deemed necessary because of technological progress which 
has substantially increased the flow of commerce between 
several states resulting in increased interaction between 
persons of this state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to 
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest 
extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 29, 1990, appellant Kamdar & Company filed a 
complaint against the appellees in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in the State of Utah to recover $24,336.00 for unpaid 
3 
accounting and financial services. In response, on April 13, 
1990, the appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Personal Jurisdiction. This Motion was granted on July 12, 1990 
on the basis that the District Court lacked either specific or 
general personal jurisdiction over the appellees. On August 24, 
1990, appellant Kamdar & Company filed its Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
1. Appellant Kamdar & Company is a Utah partnership, that 
has operated as an accounting and financial counselling business 
within the State of Utah since 1971. (See R. 1 & 77; Exhibit "A" 
at 1 3; Exhibit "C" at f 1). 
2. Appellee Laray Company, Inc. ("Laray Company") is a 
California corporation. (See R. 1, 2, 46, 47, 49 & 50; Exhibit 
"C" at I 2). 
3. Appellees Raymond Boal and James A. Boal, Jr., are or 
have been the principle officers and shareholders of Laray 
1
 For purposes of this appeal, the following pleadings or 
other documentation, all of which comprise the underlying record on 
appeal, are attached hereto as exhibits and will be utilized and 
referred to as follows: 
1. Affidavit of Vin Kamdar, filed in the District Court 
on May 14, 1990, as Exhibit "A"; 
2. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, filed in the District Court on 
April 25, 1990, as Exhibit "B"; and 
3. Complaint filed in the District Court on January 29, 
1990, as Exhibit "C". 
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Company and are both individuals residing in the State of 
California. (See R. 2, 46, 47, 49 & 50; Exhibit ,fC" at 55 3 & 
4). 
4. In or about 1971, James A. Boal, Jr., as president of 
Laray Company, then a sole proprietorship, contacted Vin Kamdar, 
regarding the desire to have him perform on-going accounting and 
financial services for him and his company. (See R. 47, 48, 50, 
51, 76 & 77; Exhibit "A" at 5 2). During that initial meeting. 
Mr. Kamdar informed Mr. Boal that he was relocating his business 
to Utah, but would be willing to perform the accounting services 
sought by Laray Company and Mr. Boal. in Utah. The parties 
agreed to this arrangement. (See R. 76 & 77; Exhibit "A" at f 
2). 
5. Accordingly, in or about 1971, Kamdar & Company, after 
moving to Utah, commenced performing diverse accounting and 
financial services to Laray Company and James A. Boal, Jr., from 
Utah and sent it's work product, including reports, returns, 
statements and comparisons to Laray Company and James A. Boal, 
Jr., in California. (See R. 77; Exhibit MB" at 5 3). No 
accounting or financial services were ever performed by Kamdar & 
Company for the appellees in California. (See R. 3, 77 & 78; 
Exhibit MAM at ff 5 & 7; Exhibit "C" at J 9). 
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6. Laray Company and Mr. Boal were billed for these 
accounting and financial services by Kamdar & Company annually. 
As a result, Laray Company and Mr. Boal's payments to Kamdar & 
Company would always be one year in arrears. (See R. 78 & 79; 
Exhibit "A" at f 8). 
7. Commencing in or about 1974, Raymond Boal (the son of 
James A. Boal) contacted Kamdar & Company in Utah and requested 
that it begin performing various additional personal accounting 
and financial services for him, including, but not limited to 
advising him on real estate transactions, tax planning and 
personal financing. These services were similarly performed in 
Utah with the resulting work product being sent to California. 
(See R. 77; Exhibit "A" at 5 4). 
8. From 1971 and continuing uninterrupted for the next 18 
years, Kamdar & Company rendered virtually all of the appellees' 
accounting and financial advising needs, including, but not 
limited to the preparation of corporate and personal tax returns, 
bank summary reports, industry comparisons, corporate financial 
statements, comparative financial statements, monthly general 
ledger reports and consultation on investment, management, real 
estate and banking matters. During this entire time all of these 
services were performed in Utah with resulting work product sent 
to the appellees in California. Kamdar & Company never performed 
6 
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ai i/y t ime i n C a l i f o r n i a . The a p p e l l e e s a lways p a i d f o r t h e s e 
s e r v i c e s on an annual b a s i s u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t d i s p u t e a r o s e . 
(See I '" I i.111 11 il; llilx.li n I u 1 I HI ; E x h i b i t a t pp. 
9 . , I U K I JLUX fvcunut Company t* n n nnrlor t i n s t i v i r e s 
noted afcove, *• va& r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e a p p e l l e e s d e l i v e r to Kamdar 
& Company f t h e i r f i n a n c i a l books and r e c o r d s , 
monthly s a l e s r e p o r t s , c o p i e s of documents and *. -*ner 
\ i> documents (See R, f>? . , _ - , , , E x h i b i t "A" ^^
 JL ^, 
Additionally, throughout the 18 year employment 
relationship between the parties, the appellees corresponded 
Xephone from, I.'.I I 11 or nia on countless occasions with 
Kamdar & Company In Utah regarding the performance of these 
various accounting and financial responsibi * - >, 
(J I , l i b i«i ; 8; Exhibit " Ixhibit at pp 
] 1 , The instant dispute arose when the appellees refused, 
after repeated demands, 
Company during the final year that Kamda Company worked for 
the appellee? (See R. 80; Exhibit "B" at f 8) Thi s fi nal 
»-i ini i.in i in I Il iJt" both c o r p o r a t e and p e r s o n a l t a x and 
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financial advice and services rendered by Kamdar & Company, (See 
R. 80; Exhibit "B" at 5 9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Each requirement is fully met to invoke specific personal 
jurisdiction under Utah's Long-Arm Statute over the appellees. 
First, the fact that the appellees hired appellants to perform 
exclusively in Utah various accounting and financial services for 
their benefit for over 18 years and indisputably affected 
business and persons within the State of Utah pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-24(1) (1953, as amended). Second, this very 
activity is the conduct on which the present claims arise. 
Finally, the appellees chose to use the appellant, a Utah 
company, to do their accounting and other financial needs for 18 
years on an annual basis, coupled with their refusal to pay for 
these services justifies a finding based on all notions of 
fairness and substantial justice that the appellees come to Utah 
to explain why they so refuse to pay the appellant, a Utah 
company. The District Court does have specific personal 
jurisdiction over the appellees. 
ARGUMENT 
This appeal has been filed to seek review of the District 
Court's ruling that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over 
the appellees. The District Court's ruling is inapposite to both 
8 
Lcable be 
discussed herein, the District Court does have specific personal 
jurisdiction over the appellees. 
A. The Requirements To Establish Specific Personal 
Jurisdiction Are Distinctive From Those To Establish 
General Personal Jurisdiction. 
over appellees rests with the preliminary distinction between 
"genera: "specific" personal jurisdiction. The appellant 
the 
appellees under Utah's Long-Arm Statute. The appellant has not 
asserted that general jurisdiction exists based upon thr 
appellees doing business lstinction JS eritu.al, 
This point, the appellees eventually conceded, I LULL R- ""»U # But 
distinction between general and specific personal 
urisdiction has been fully embraced by the Utah courts.2 As 
2 Earlier Utah case law that failed to make this distinction has 
been effectively abandoned. This point was recently addressed by 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah in Nova 
Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F.Supp. 1123 (D. Utah 1986). In Nova 
Mud, the court found that under current Utah law, the courts have 
"rejected its [the Utah courts] prior statements that any 
distinction between 'doing business1 and 'minimum contact' was 
semantic rather than substantive." Tel, -it 3 125. The court 
continued: 
By making that recognition ii Utah court brought into 
question a number or prior precedents which essentially 
applied the 'doing business' test even with the long-arm 
9 
discussed in Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp,. 
578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6 (Utah 1978): 
General personal jurisdiction is the concept reflected in a 
doing business statute, which requires substantial and 
continued local activity; specific personal jurisdiction is 
the concept applicable to a long-arm statute, which requires 
only minimum local contacts. . . . Where a defendant's 
forum-state activity is extensive, the forum may assert 
personal jurisdiction on either related or unrelated claims 
(doing business concept). Where the defendant has only 
minimum contacts with the forum, personal jurisdiction may 
be asserted only on claims arising out of the defendant's 
forum-state activity (long-arm or transaction of business 
concept). 
Appellant does not attempt (nor need it attempt do so) to 
establish that the appellees have had substantial and continuous 
activity within Utah to invoke the court's general jurisdiction. 
(See R. 37-41). Rather, appellant has always maintained that the 
statute was asserted as the basis for invoking jurisdiction. 
In any event, it is clear that the Utah court now adheres to 
the Utah legislature's mandate that standards be no more 
restrictive than those under federal due process limitations. 
Id. 
The Nova Mud court even pointed out some of these now 
obsolete opinions. These included Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics 
Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976) and Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen & 
Co. , 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976). See Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 
supra, 648 F.Supp. at 1125 n.l. These two cases are two of the 
three central cases cited by the appellees in their attempt to 
attack the District Court's jurisdictional authority. The third 
case White v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 549 P.2d 439 (Utah 1976) suffers 
from the same now rejected premise. (See R. 37-39). 
10 
Court specific personal jurisdiction over the case. 
Thi- evidenced h]r several unopposed operative facts, 
1 = i :i :i:i t:i all • :i)i: a]
 c o ntract entered into between the 
parties In :i 9 i Il included the understanding that al ] the services 
would be performed :li i i I J te L1 1 (S e e Statement :: f t: 
"Facts") at f 1); (2) the appel lant performed these requested 
accounting and financing services I i I Utal i for 18 years for the 
these services was renewed or terminable each year, thereby 
making the fees that are owing the present case 
i 
California, and Kamdar & Company, : " rtah (See Facts ?* i 
^resent case based on LUG collection of 
. t" -r..3es appellees contacts with tl :ic= State > 
(See Facts al, % 1 I) . ; of these facts have been controverted 
by the appellees. These facts undisputab 1 n n-slablisl i |n 11 i 
facie showing that the District Court has specific personal 
jurisdiction over t resolution of the payment for these very 
\\<•> i ' • i ( i"" i ""i*iu A n d e * « ^ ; „,v..L. Aiiei; i c a n S o c i e t y of Plastic Surgeons, 
148 Utah Adv. Rep (November 15, 1990). 
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over The Appellees Based 
On Utah's Long-Arm Statute. 
The governing statutory law over this issue is Utah's Long-
Arm Statute. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-22 et seq. (1953, as 
amended). The scope and purpose of this statute has been 
codified in section 78-27-22 of the Utah Code, which, in 
pertinent part, provides: 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, 
that the public interest demands the state provide its 
citizens with an effective means of redress against 
nonresident persons who, through certain significant minimal 
contacts with the state, incur obligations to citizens 
entitled to the state's protection. . . 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to 
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert 
jurisdiction over nonresident Appellees to the fullest 
extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah courts have consistently complied with this policy 
declaration and have given themselves jurisdiction to the fullest 
extent allowed under the due process of law. See, e.g., Parry v. 
Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1989); 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 
1985); Brown v. Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980). The 
appellees also conceded these facts. (See R. 68 & 69). 
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C. All Requirements Are Met To confer On The District 
Court Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over The 
Appellees. 
Supreme Court has recently again reaffirmed that 
governed, ion to Utah's Long-Arm Statute, by meeting due 
process requirements as determined under federal jurisdictional 
nnderson v. American society of Plastic Surgeons, i 
Utah AT... " (November 15. 1990" See also Nova Mud Corp. v. 
Fletcher F.Supr: ULCUS 
. . Lcient mvoke specific personal jurisdiction must 
include three features: (1) * ?,.• activity must fall under at least 
one L 
Long-Arm Statute (see McGee v, International Life Insurance Co,, 
355 U.S. 220', 223 (II 95 7)); (2) the controversy must arise of 
I IIIi 11 !:i :i I:: (se e I lanson v. penckla 
and (J) the? assertion of jurisdiction must ' violate the 
notions of fair play and substantial justice (see International 
Shoe Co* v. Washington, . See accord 
Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988), Each of these 
elements are fully satisfied in the present case. 
1. The appellees have engaged in the transaction of 
business within Utah. 
The first step i i I a long-arm jurisdictional analysis is to 
establish that the party's conduct falls with the purview of one 
of the enumerated statutory provisions. In pertinent part, Utah 
law provides: 
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of 
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of 
the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an 
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24(1) (1953, as amended)(Emphasis added). 
What "transaction of business within this state" entails is 
defined in Section 78-27-23(2) of the Utah Code as "activities of 
a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this 
state which affect persons or businesses within the state of 
Utah." (Emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has given 
expansive construction to this definition, finding that a person 
may transact business within the state without a physical 
presence in Utah. See Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 
P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985). This liberal construction finds 
similar support in the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g.. 
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.. 355 U.S. 220, 223 
(1957) . 
In the present case the appellees have for the past 18 years 
employed on an annually renewable basis the services of the 
appellant, a Utah partnership. (See Facts at 5 8). The appellees 
have had actual knowledge that during all of this time, the 
14 
appellant has been located in Utah. (See Facts 
appellees
 h a v e s e n t its account books and records to tin;? 
appellant /ered payment for such services to 
11 III (111 1 1 I 11 II 1 1 1 I I ' 1 1 . " i I I I II I I II III I II H i 
conversations regarding the services it wished the appellant to 
perform and received counsel regarding its conduct of business 
(See '•  I ml i " mi i nil 11 II y , 
appellees continued use ol appellant's services i i i Utah enabled 
them to reap • tl: le financial savings of paying Utah rates, rather 
S- :: n i tl in = :t: i 1 Ca] :i f ::)i: i i:i a i: a te .s f DI tl lese sei: v\:i ces These 
activities evidences that the appellees conduct clearly has 
affected persons and businesses within the State c f IJtal: i 
required by statute. See also Nova Mud Corp, v. Fletcher, 
F.Supp. 1123, 1126 (D. Utah 1986). 
2 . The appellant' s claims a n so uut. o 1 t.he appe 11 ees " 
contacts in Utah, 
whether the claims asserted arise out < the conduct with the 
forum state. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U S 235i 251-52 (1958). 
tj r s c c: i" 
forum state can established the "general" jurisdictional test 
•V-F "doing business" within the state need not hup mrl , j, U, ; Nov a 
Mucl Q0rx>% Ym Fletcher, supra. Mil h'.Supp. •• see also McGee 
v. International Life Insurance Co,, supra. 355 U.S. at 223 
(1957). 
In the instant case, the very claims asserted by the 
appellant arises from the connection the appellees have with 
Utah. Namely, the appellees1 contact in Utah is their contracts 
with the appellant to do accounting work and business counselor 
for them. The instant dispute is over these very services. (See 
Facts at 5 11). Accordingly, the Hanson requirements are fully 
satisfied. 
3. The assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
The final step in this jurisdictional analysis is the 
determination of whether the court's assertion of jurisdiction 
over the appellees is consistent with federal due process 
"notions of fair play and substantial justice." International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316. The Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted this concept holding that the central concern 
under this third step is "the relationship of the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation to each other." Mallory Engineering v. 
Ted R. Brown & Associates. 618 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Utah 1980); See 
also American Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers 
Maatschappij. 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Under this analysis, once it has been established that the 
claims arose from the activity that the appellees conducted 
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within the state, t • - remaii factor «. wheth* 
"conduct and connection with the forum State [is] such that 
[they] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
"
,
 Wor Id-Wide V o Ikswaaen Corp v Woodson, II -« i , 
297 (1980). See also Hanson v. Denckla, supra. 3 . ii, at , "" 
Milliken v. Mever, 311 1 J S 457, 4 63 (1940) See accord 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co. . Ltd. , supra, ' id at 
1110; Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d ?44, 246-4 ; ' 
(Utah 1980) . 
preser . nasp a"* -\& wr\r\
 J£o opppii ant for 
the appellees was performed * ind requested by 
appellees. i t r^ * < t, i i I 
financial material necessary for completion ;he accounting 
were shipped * t i u - ould be done within the 
these business transactions, the amount of work done at the 
appellees request - benefit by the appellant within the state, 
1 • Dor por a t ti' f i nancial documentation to 
the state, the prior history of bill ing and payments >. ;-, to 
and from the state, and the full knowledge of I" lie appe]";, • 
IJU'J mess wan:, being carried on within utah at their request and 
benefit evidences the intrinsic fairness of requiring the 
appellees to defend their refusal to pay for these services here 
in Utah. 
Furthermore, at the end of any given year, the appellees 
could have chosen a new accountant, one located in California. 
Yet, this the appellees chose not to do. For year after year the 
appellees renewed their contracts with the appellant to fulfill 
their accounting and financial needs. Each time the appellees 
renewed these agreements, they openly acknowledged their 
awareness and acceptance that they were doing business with a 
Utah company in Utah. This they freely and consistently chose to 
do. By so doing, they subjected themselves to the specific 
personal jurisdiction of the District Court to resolve the 
present dispute over these very fees. Balancing the interests of 
the state with the inconvenience to the appellees, the court's 
extension of jurisdiction over the appellees is a reasonable and 
valid exercise of its jurisdictional power. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on all relevant facts and applicable law the District 
Court erred in finding that it lacked specific personal 
jurisdiction over the appellees. The facts are not in dispute. 
The appellees chose to hire the appellant with actual knowledge 
at that time that the appellant would be relocating to Utah. For 
the next 18 years, the appellees annually hired the appellant to 
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perform accounting and financial services for them. All of these 
services were performed in Utah. This included having all 
necessary documentation sent or brought to Utah as well as 
numerous telephone conversations between the parties. All 
services were paid by the appellees, with the exception of the 
services rendered during the appellant's final year of 
employment. 
Utah's Long Arm Statute provides the maximum allowable 
protection to residents against nonresidents of Utah under the 
Constitution. This protection extends, under the present facts, 
to conferring specific personal jurisdiction on the District 
Court over the appellees, based on appellees contacts with the 
state of Utah. First, the ongoing retention of the appellant's 
services by the appellees satisfies the statutory requirement 
that the appellees affected persons or businesses within the 
State of Utah. Second, the appellees' hiring of the appellant is 
the very contact underlying this instant dispute. Finally, due 
to the appellees' annual decision to use the appellant, a Utah 
company, the continuous contact with the appellants in the form 
of documentation being sent to Utah and telephone conversations 
discussions, and the appellees actual knowledge that they were 
doing business with a company in Utah, satisfies all due process 
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concerns in requiring the appellees to come to Utah to resolve 
the present dispute. 
Accordingly, the District Court's ruling should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of December, 1990. 
JONES, WAHDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
f. Walker 
150(0" Kirst Interstate Plaza 
L70 Soiyth Main Street 
Lt Lake City, Utah 
(801) 521-3200 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of December, 1990 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to the following: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mark J. Perrizo 
WILSON, WILSON & PERRIZOy 
10901 Paramount Bouleva 
Downey, CA 90241 
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Exhibit A 
Jeffrey N. Walker (USB #5556) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE Cr "TAH 
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h f | 7 II i s AH '30 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAMDAR & COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND 
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, Jr., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF VIN KAMDAR 
Civil No. 9004000079 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
ss. 
Vin Kamdar, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am the general partner of Kamdar & Company, a 
Utah partnership doing business in the State of Utah and as such 
I have personal knowledge of the information stated herein. 
2. In or about 1971, James A. Boal, Jr., acting as 
president of the Laray Company, then a sole proprietorship, 
entered into an oral contract with me to have certain accounting 
and financial services for him and his company performed on an 
on-going basis. At that time, I told Mr.Boal I was relocating my 
business to Utah and would be happy to perform these services for 
him in Utah. Mr. Boal agreed to this arrangement. 
3. Accordingly, in or about 1971, I moved to Utah and 
Kamdar & Company began performing the accounting and financial 
services as requested by Mr. Boal, personally and in behalf of 
the Laray Company. 
4. In or about 1974, Mr. James A. Boal, Jr. , at my 
advise and counsel incorporated the Laray Company. Kamdar & 
Company continued to render diverse accounting and financial 
services to Mr. James A. Boal, Jr. and the Laray Company. 
Additionally, beginning around this time Kamdar & Company also 
began rendering various financial services to Raymond Boal, 
including, but not limited to real estate transactions, tax 
planning and personal financing. 
5. At all times, the defendants understood that all 
these accounting and financial services both personal and 
corporate would be and were being performed in Utah. This 
required having all the books and records of the individuals and 
the Laray Company, including, but not limited to check stubs, 
payroll reports, monthly sale reports, and copies of loan 
contracts either sent or delivered to Utah. The defendants have 
always complied with this necessity. As a result, all the work 
and review on these records and documents by Kamdar & Company 
occurred in Utah. 
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6. Throughout these 18 years, the defendants have 
corresponded by mail and telephone on countless occasions with 
the plaintiff regarding the performance of the accounting 
responsibilities for them by Kamdar & Company. Countless 
conversations were also had by mail and telephone between the 
defendants and the plaintiff regarding business advise, planning 
and opportunities. All of these correspondence took place 
between Utah and California. 
7. No accounting or bookkeeping services were ever 
rendered to the defendants by Kamdar & Company while I was a 
resident of California. Rather, all work performed for and in 
behalf of the defendants by Kamdar & Company was done in Utah. 
This work commenced in or about 1971 and continuing for eighteen 
years. During this time, Kamdar & Company performed all 
accounting services for the Laray Company, various personal 
accounting and financial services for James A. Boal, Jr. and 
Raymond Boal, this included, but not limited to the preparation 
of corporate tax returns, bank summary reports, industry 
comparisons, comparative financials, corporate financial 
statements, monthly general ledger reports, consultation on 
investments, management, real estate and banking matters, and 
personal tax and financing advice and document preparation. 
8. The instant dispute arose when the defendants 
refused, after repeated demands, to pay for services rendered by 
Kamdar & Company during the final year of employment with the 
defendants. As was the custom established throughout the time 
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Kamdar & Company was employed by the defendants, their bills were 
always paid one year in arrears. As a result, the greater 
portion of the amount currently owing by the defendants to Kamdar 
& Company is for the immediately preceding year prior to its 
termination• Additional amounts are owing for final accounting 
services rendered as requested by the defendants• 
9. The amount owing to Kamdar & Company by the 
defendants includes both corporate and personal tax and financial 
advice and services. 
DATED this \( day of May, 19^0. 
by: V<W l/\CM~^ 
Vin Kamdai 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the W fr 
ss. 
) 
day of May, 1990, personally appeared 
before me Vin Kamdar, the signer flof; tjte foregoing instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he m ed t h e same . 
JOTJ&Y PUBLIC 
Lding a t : kky^L 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
NOTABY PUBLIC 
JlftftB V It WALKER 
ITOSoatftllmnSt 
S*»L*MC«y UUh 64101 
My Commission Expires 
MsrcnS 1994 
STATE OF UTAH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \y day of May,1990. I caused 
to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit 
of Vin Kamdar to the following: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
311 South State Street 
Suite 380 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 81H111-2379 
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Exhibit B 
Jeffrey N. Walker (USB #5556) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAMDAR & COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND 
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil NO. 9004000079 
Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, submits the following Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
INTRODUCTION 
This action arises from the failure of the defendants 
to pay for certain accounting and business services rendered in 
Utah by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is a Utah partnership 
operating an accounting and financial counselling business in 
Utah. The corporate defendant Laray Company, Inc. ("Laray") is a 
California corporation. The defendants Raymond and James Boal 
are both residents in California. 
For the past 18 years, the plaintiff and the defendants 
have had an ongoing contractual arrangement whereby the plaintiff 
rendered yearly, quarterly and monthly accounting services, as 
well as ongoing business advice to the defendants. For all of 
these 18 years the plaintiff has been located in Utah. On or 
about March 24, 1989, the plaintiff submitted to Laray a bill for 
various accounting services in the amount of $26,194.00. On or 
about May 12, 1989, the defendant Raymond Boal, as the new 
president of Laray, replied by letter refusing full payment. 
The plaintiff has made repeated demands for payment for 
these rendered services, but the defendants have and continue to 
refusal to pay. The defendants refusal has required the 
plaintiff to file the instant action to recover such amounts 
owing from the defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
The defendants have filed the instant motion alleging 
that this Court is without jurisdiction over the parties. 
This claim is wrong. This Court does have specific personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants based on their contacts 
with the State of Utah. 
I. THIS COURT HAS SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
A. There Is A Critical Distinction Between Specific And 
General Jurisdiction. 
The issue in dispute is simple: Does this court have 
specific personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants. 
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The governing statutory law is Utah's Long-Arm Statute. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-27-22 et seq. (1953, as amended). The scope and 
purpose of this statute has been codified in section 78-27-22 of 
the Utah Code, which, in pertinent part, provides: 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, 
that the public interest demands the state provide its 
citizens with an effective means of redress against 
nonresident persons who, through certain significant minimal 
contacts with the state, incur obligations to citizens 
entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action 
is deemed necessary because of technological progress which 
has substantially increased the flow of commerce between 
several states resulting in increased interaction between 
persons of this state and persons of other states. The 
provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to 
citizens of this stater should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest 
extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah courts have consistently complied with this 
policy declaration and have given themselves jurisdiction to the 
fullest extent allowed by the due process of law. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Carnes Corp.r 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980). 
In the instant case, the issue of whether this court 
has jurisdiction over the defendants rests with the distinction 
between "general" and "specific" jurisdiction. It is this 
distinction which the defendants have failed to recognize. 
Simply, the plaintiff asserts specific personal jurisdiction over 
the defendants based on Utah's Long-Arm Statute, rather than 
general jurisdiction based upon the defendants doing business in 
Utah. This distinction is critical. 
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1. The Utah courts have recognized the distinction between 
specific and general jurisdiction. 
This distinction has been recently and fully embraced 
by the Utah courts. As aptly discussed in Abbott G.M. Diesel v. 
Piper Aircraft. 578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6 (Utah 1978): 
General personal jurisdiction is the concept reflected in a 
doing business statute, which reguires substantial and 
continued local activity; specific personal jurisdiction is 
the concept applicable to a long-arm statute, which reguires 
only minimum local contacts. . . . Where a defendant's 
forum-state activity is extensive, the forum may assert 
personal jurisdiction on either related or unrelated claims 
(doing business concept). Where the defendant has only 
minimum contacts with the forum, personal jurisdiction may 
be asserted only on claims arising out of the defendant's 
forum-state activity (long-arm or transaction of business 
concept). 
The plaintiff does not attempt nor need it attempt to 
assert, as claimed by the defendants, that the defendants have 
substantial and continuous activity within Utah to invoke the 
court's general jurisdiction. (See Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp.6-10 
(hereinafter "Defendants' Memorandum")). Rather, the plaintiff 
asserts that the defendant's retention of the plaintiff as its 
accountant and business advisor for the past 18 years and now 
their failure to pay for these services rendered in Utah invokes 
this court's specific personal jurisdiction over the resolution 
of the payment for these very services. 
2. The defendants have failed to acknowledge the 
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction. 
The failure of the defendants to acknowledge this 
distinction is fatal to their position that this court lacks 
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jurisdiction. This failure is evidenced by the defendant's own 
pleading which uniformly cites Utah cases of now questionable 
validity. The cases cited in the Defendants' Memorandum on the 
issue of jurisdiction have now been abandoned by the Utah 
courts. This reality was directly addressed by the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah in Nova Mud Corp. v. L.H. 
Fletcher, 648 F.Supp. 1123 (D. Utah 1986). In Nova Mud, the 
court first found that under current Utah law, the courts have 
"rejected its [the Utah courts] prior statements that any 
distinction between 'doing business' and 'minimum contact' was 
semantic rather than substantive." Id. at-1125. The court 
continued: 
By making that recognition, the Utah court brought into 
question a number or prior precedents which essentially 
applied the 'doing business' test even with the long-arm 
statute was asserted as the basis for invoking jurisdiction. 
In any event, it is clear that the Utah court now adheres to 
the Utah legislature's mandate that standards be no more 
restrictive than those under federal due process 
limitations. 
Id. 
The Nova Mudd court even pointed out some of these now 
obsolete opinions. These included United Ski Co. v. Union 
Plastic Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976) and Cate Rental Co. v. 
Whalen & Co.P 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976). See Nova Mudd Corp. v. 
Fletcher, supra. 648 F.Supp. at 1125 n.l. These two cases are 
two of the three central cases cited by the defendants in their 
attempt to attack this court's jurisdictional authority. The 
third case White v. Arthur Murray. Inc.. 549 P.2d 439 (Utah 1976) 
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suffers from the same now rejected premise. (See Defendants' 
Memorandum, pp.6-8). 
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Is Governed By Due 
Process Limitations. 
Conduct which is sufficient to invoke long-arm 
jurisdiction must include three features: (1) the activity must 
fall under at least one of the specifically enumerated statutory 
acts (see McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 
220, 223 (1957)); (2) the controversy must arise out of the 
activity (see Hanson v. Denckla. 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)); and 
(3) the assertion of jurisdiction must not violate the notions of 
fair play and substantial justice (see International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Each of these elements 
are fully satisfied in the instant case. 
1. Defendants Have Engaged In The "Transaction Of Any 
Business Within The State". 
The first step in a long-arm jurisdictional analysis is 
to establish that the party's conduct falls within the purview of 
one of the enumerated statutory provisions under Utah's Long-Arm 
Statute. In pertinent part, Utah's long-Arm Statute provides: 
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of 
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of 
the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an 
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
fl) the transaction of any business within this state . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24(1) (1953, as amended)(emphasis added). 
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What "transaction of business within this state" 
entails is defined in Section 78-27-23(2) of the Utah Code as 
"activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or 
representatives in this state which affect persons or businesses 
within the state of Utah," (Emphasis added). The Utah Supreme 
Court has given an expansive construction to this definition 
finding that a person may transact business within the state even 
without a physical presence in Utah. See Brown v. Washoe Housing 
Authority, 625 F.Supp. 595, 599 (D.Utah 1985); and Synergetics v. 
Marathon Ranching Co.. 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985). This 
liberal construction finds similar support in the United States 
Supreme Court. See, e.g.. McGee v. International Life Insurance 
Co.. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
In the instant case the defendants have for past 18 
years employed the services of the plaintiff, a Utah partnership. 
The defendants have had actual knowledge that during all of this 
time, the plaintiff has been located in Utah. The defendants 
have sent its account books and records to the plaintiff in Utah, 
have delivered payment for such services to the plaintiff in Utah 
and have had countless telephone conversations regarding the 
services it wished the plaintiff to preform and received counsel 
regarding its conduct of business from the plaintiff in Utah. 
These activities evidences that the defendants conduct meets the 
Utah statute in that they affects persons and businesses within 
the State of Utah. See Nova Mudd Corp. v. Fletcher, supra. 648 
F.Supp. at 1126. 
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2. Plaintiff's claims roust arise out of the defendants 
activity within Utah. 
The second step in a jurisdictional analysis is to 
determine whether the claims asserted arise out of the conduct 
with the forum state. See Hanson v. Dencklaf 357 U.S. 235, 251-
52 (1958). If the nexus between the claim and the party's 
conduct with the forum state can be established the "general" 
jurisdictional test of "doing business" within the state need not 
be met. Id.; and Nova Mudd Corp. v. FletcherP supra, 648 F.Supp. 
at 1126. See also McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 
supra. 355 U.S. at 223 (1957). 
In the instant case, the very claims asserted by the 
plaintiff arise from the connection the defendants have with 
Utah. Namely, the defendant's principal activity within Utah is 
their retention of the plaintiff to do accounting and business 
counselor work for them. The instant dispute is over these very 
services. The Hanson requirements are fully satisfied. 
3. The Court's assertion of jurisdiction is consistent 
with federal due process. 
The final step in our jurisdictional analysis is the 
determination of whether the court's assertion of jurisdiction 
over the defendants is consistent with federal due process 
"notions of fair play and substantial justice." International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316. The Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted this concept holding that the central concern 
under this third step is "the relationship of the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation, to each other." Mallory Engineering 
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v, Ted R. Brown & Associates. 618 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1980); and 
American Land Program. Inc. v. Bonaventura Uiteverss 
Maatschappii. 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Under this analysis, once it has been established that 
the claims arose from the activity in which the defendants 
conducted in the state the remaining factor is whether the 
defendants7 "conduct and connection with the forum State [is] 
such that [they] should reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsonr 444 U.S. 
286, 297 (1980). See also Hanson v. Denckla, supra. 357 U.S. at 
252; and Milliken v. Meyer. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). See accord 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co.. Ltd.. supra, 701 P.2d at 
1110; Brown v. Carnes Corp.. 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980); and 
Burt Drilling. Inc. v. Portadrill. 608 P.2d 244, 246-47 (Utah 
1980). 
In the instant case, all the work done by the plaintiff for 
the defendant within the time covered by the outstanding bills 
was performed in Utah. Documents, files, and financial material 
necessary for the completion of the accounting were shipped to 
Utah to for access so that the work could be done within the 
state. Due to the extended nature of this business transaction, 
the amount of work done by the plaintiff within the state, the 
movement of personal and corporate financial documentation to the 
state, the prior history of billing and payments via mail to and 
from the state, and the full knowledge of the defendants that 
business was being carried on within Utah evidences the intrinsic 
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fairness of requiring the defendants to defend their refusal to 
pay for these services here in Utah. Balancing the interests of 
the state with the inconvenience to the defendants, the court's 
extension of jurisdiction over the defendants is a reasonable and 
valid exercise of jurisdictional power. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah's Long-Arm Statute vests this court with specific 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The defendants' 
arguments fail to make the critical distinction between general 
and specific jurisdiction thereby improperly asserting that this 
Court lacks any jurisdictional authority over this matter. 
Because of current Utah law which recognizes this distinction and 
the defendants meeting the requisite elements to invoke this 
courts long-arm jurisdiction, the plaintiff respectfully request 
that this Court deny the defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this T-S day of April, 1990. 
JONEfp, fi^L00' HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
^^ .L^ icy N. Walker 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the £</ day of April, 1990, I 
caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the following: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
311 South State Street 
Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379 
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Exhibit C 
Jeffrey N. Walker (USB #5556) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAMDAR & COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND 
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR., 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
C ivii NO. Qrwrmn 
Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, upon information and 
belief, alleges and for causes of action states as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Kamdar & Co. is a partnership organized 
under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of 
business in Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon 
alleges that defendant Laray, Co., Inc. ("Laray") is a business 
organization with its principal place of business in Orange 
County, State of California. 
3. Plaintiff is informed and believe and thereon 
alleges that the defendant Raymond Boal is an individual and 
current president of Laray and resides in Los Angeles County, 
State of California. 
4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon 
alleges that the defendant James A. Boal, Jr. is an individual 
and former president of Laray and resides in Orange County, 
State of California. 
5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon 
alleges that the defendants Raymond Boal and James A. Boal, Jr. 
are guarantors of the debts of Laray. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
6. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon 
alleges that this Court has jurisdiction over the matters 
alleged herein pursuant to the Utah Code Anno. Section 78-27-24 
(1953, as amended) in that the defendants' transaction of 
business and contracting for services with the plaintiff 
occurred within the State of Utah. 
7. Venue of this action is properly vested in this 
court pursuant to Utah Code Anno. Section 78-13-1 (1953, as 
amended) in that the claims alleged herein occurred as a result 
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of the services preformed for the exclusive benefit of the 
defendants by the plaintiff within the jurisdiction of this 
district, in the State of Utah, 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
8. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by 
reference Paragraphs 1 through 7 of this Complaint as though 
set forth in full herein. 
9. In or about 1971 through 1988, the plaintiff and 
Laray entered into an ongoing contractual arrangement (the 
"Contracts") whereby the plaintiff would render on a yearly, 
quarterly and monthly basis various financial and tax services, 
including, but not limited to the preparation of corporate tax 
returns, bank summary reports, industry comparisons, 
comparative financials, corporate financial statements and 
monthly general ledger reports, as well as financial 
consultation on various investment, management, real estate and 
banking matters for Laray (hereinafter collectively referred to 
as the "Services"). 
10. At all times relevant herein the Services 
rendered by the plaintiff for the defendants was performed in 
Utah for the benefit of Laray's business in California. 
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11. In or about 1971 through 1988, the plaintiff did 
rendered Services for Laray, submitted billings and accounting 
statements on a monthly, quarterly or yearly basis to Laray for 
these Services and Laray paid the plaintiff pursuant to the 
billing and accounting statements, pursuant to the Contracts. 
12. In or about early March, 1989, the defendant 
James A. Boal, Jr., then president of Laray, informed the 
plaintiff that once the last quarter of the 1988 financial and 
tax services which the plaintiff was in the process of 
completing were finished, as a result of an anticipated change 
in management of Laray, the plaintiff's Services would be no 
longer required, and requested a final bill and accounting for 
all outstanding unpaid Services. 
13. In response to the defendant James A. Boal, Jr.'s 
request, on or about March 24, 1989, that the plaintiff 
submitted to Laray a final bill and accounting for unpaid 
Services rendered for the exclusive benefit of Laray, pursuant 
to the Contracts, in the amount of Twenty Six Thousand One 
Hundred Ninety Four Dollars ($26,194.00) plus accruing interest 
and service charges. A copy of said final billing and 
accounting statement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
incorporated by reference herein. 
14. On or about May 12, 1989, the defendant Raymond 
Boal, as the new president of Laray, replied by letter to the 
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plaintiff, acknowledging that the plaintiff had preformed 
substantial Services for the benefit of Laray which remained 
unpaid, but refused to reimburse the plaintiff for the amount, 
as reflected in the plaintiff's March 24, 1989 billing and 
accounting statement, claiming that the amount should be 
reduced. A copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" and incorporated by reference herein. 
15. On or about June 8, 1989, Laray, in further 
acknowledgment of the debt it owed to the plaintiff sent the 
plaintiff a check in the amount of Two Thousand Three Hundred 
Eighty Two Dollars ($2,382.00). 
16. On or about July 7, 1989 and again on July 21, 
1989, the plaintiff responded to the defendant Raymond Boal's 
claim that the amount owing to the plaintiff by Laray should be 
reduced expressly rejecting this claim and again requesting 
that the full amount be paid pursuant to the Contracts between 
the plaintiff and Laray. A copy of these letters are attached 
hereto as Exhibits WC" and MD", respectively and incorporated 
by reference herein. 
17. On or about July 25, 1989, the defendant Raymond 
Boal, by letter, informed the plaintiff that it would not pay 
the plaintiff pursuant to the Contracts, claiming that the 
plaintiff's bills for the Services rendered were considered too 
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high and that Laray had located other "accounting services" 
which would work for less. A copy of said letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit ME" and incorporated by reference herein. 
18. On or about August 16, 1989, the plaintiff, by 
letter, again attempted to encourage Laray to fulfill its 
commitments under the Contracts and pay the plaintiff for the 
Services it had rendered for the exclusive benefit of Laray. 
This letter further informed Laray that the defendant Raymond 
Boal's earlier acknowledgments that the plaintiff had performed 
substantial financial, tax and consulting services and the 
corresponding amount Laray was willing to pay failed to account 
for all the Services so rendered, as noted in the March 24, 
1989 billing and accounting statement. A copy of said letter 
is attached hereto as Exhibit MF" and incorporated by reference 
herein. 
19. The defendants have failed to make any further 
payment in accordance to the Contracts between the plaintiff 
and Laray for the Services rendered by the plaintiff for the 
exclusive benefit of Laray. 
20. The plaintiff has performed all of its 
obligations under the terms of the Contracts. 
21. The plaintiff has demanded that the defendants 
pay pursuant to the Contracts, but the defendants have and 
continued to refuse to pay such amounts or any portion thereof. 
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22. As a result of the defendants' failure to pay the 
amounts owed to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover from the defendants the amount of Twenty Four Thousand 
Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($24,336.00)/ together with 
interest thereon at the highest, legal rate as allowed by law 
from the date of the defendant's breach of the Contracts, and 
judgment should be entered against the defendants and in favor 
of the plaintiff in that amount. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against the 
defendants as set forth hereinafter in Plaintiff's Prayer for 
Relief. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Unjust Enrichment) 
23. The plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 22 of this 
complaint as though set forth in full herein. 
24. The defendants have been unjustly enriched in the 
amount of Twenty Four Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars 
($24,336.00) as a result of the defendants' failure to pay for 
the Services rendered by the plaintiff as alleged herein, and 
in equity and good conscience, the defendants should not be 
permitted to enjoy the benefits of said Services, and the 
-7-
plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants the amount 
by which the defendants have been unjustly enriched. 
25. For the reasons set forth herein, the defendants 
are liable to the plaintiff in the amount of Twenty Four 
Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($24,336.00), 
together with interest thereon at the highest, legal rate as 
allowed by law from the date of the defendant's wrongful 
conduct, and judgment should be entered against the defendants 
and in favor of the plaintiff in that amount. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the 
defendant as set forth in Plaintiffs Prayer for Relief. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff pray: 
1. For judgment against the defendants on each of the 
Claims for Relief as noted herein in the amount of Twenty Four 
Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($24,336.00), 
together with interest thereon at the highest legal rate from 
the date of the defendants' breach and/or wrongful conduct; 
-8-
2. For an award of a reasonable attorney's fees, 
court costs and expenses incurred in this action; and 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court 
may deem equitable and just under the circumstances. 
DATED this 3?J day of January, 1990. 
JONES, WALDO,I HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By. 
Attorn^ e 
^/ 
Walker 
for Plaintiff 
jnw 218/pb 
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KAMDAR & CO. 
10 SOUTH STATE STREET 
LINDON, UT 84042 
March 24, 1989 
James A. Boal, Jr., President 
Laray Co., Inc. 
P. 0. Box 462 
La Habra, CA 90631 
Accounting services rendered: 
Preparation of Corp. Tax Returns Fy 86-87. . . .$ 5,580. 
Preparation of Corp. Tax Returns Fy 87-88. . . . 4,983. 
Bank Reporting to Mitsubishi 86-87 4,052c 
Bank Reporting to Mitsubishi 87-88 4,152. 
Comparative Fianacials 86-87 & 87-88 3,052. 
General Ledger Work 7-1-87 to 12-31-88 2,700. 
Financials of the Principals 1-1-88 928. 
Out of Pocket costs 747 c 
Total services rendered $ 26,194. 
If the total payment is not received in 30 days, a late charge of 
12.00 per cent will be added to the unpaid balance. 
The billing is payable upon receipt. 
KttDAR & CO. 
10 SOUTH STATE STREET 
LINDON, UTAH 84042 
RE: ACCOUNTING SERVICES RENDERED: 
7//IO 
P.O. BOX 462 • LA HABRA. CA 90631 
IM 12, 1989 
PREPARATION OF CORP. TAX RETURNS FY 87-88 
BANK REPORTING TO MITSUBISHI 87-88 
COMPARATIVE FIAMACIALS 87-88 
GENERAL LEDGER WORK 7-1-87 TO 12-31-88 
FINANCIALS OF THE PRINCIPALS 1-1-88 ' 
TOTAL 
4,983. 
4,152. 
1,526. 
'2,700. 
928. 
14,289.00 
LISTED ABOVE IS THE TOTAL AMDUNT OWED TO KAMDAR & CO. BY 
LARAY CO., FOR ACCOUNTING SERVICES. PAYMENT WILL BE HADE 
IN SIX INSTALLMENTS AT 2,381.50 . 
SINCERELY, 
R A T B O A I — s 
PRESIDENT 
R B / r l 
TAX LOR, MOODY & THORNE, i .J. 
ATTORNEYS A N D COUNSELORS AT LAW 
FORMERLY 
THOMAS S. TAYLOR CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
ROBERT L. MOODY 252> NORTH CANYON ROAD 
D.EUGENE THORNE COUNTRY CLUB COURT 
' ' ' on anv n„ TELEPHONE 
of Counsel P.O. BOX 1466
 (g01) 373>272l 
KAY ALDRICH LINDSAY PROVO, UTAH 84603 FAX (801) 375-6293 
July 7, 1989 
Ray Boal, Jr., President 
LaRay Company, Inc. 
P.O. Box 462 
La Habra, CA 90631 
re: Kamdar v. LaRay Company, Inc. 
Dear Mr. Boal: 
Your memo dated May 12, 1989, regarding accounting 
services rendered by Kamdar & Company has been brought to my 
office. I return a copy of that letter together with a copy of 
Kamdar & Company's billing, dated March 24, 1989. The amount 
shown on the March 24, 1989, billing is the amount owed to Kamdar 
& Company and not as characterized by yourself. 
Should you opt to make monthly installments as you have 
suggested in your memo dated May 12, 1989, a 12% interest charge 
will be added. 
Mr. Kamdar is sorry that you have chosen not to 
continue using his services but that is not a reason to excuse 
you from payment of the services previously rendered. 
Should this account not be paid in a reasonable period 
of time, I have been instructed to turn it over for collection to 
correspondent counsel in California. 
Should you have any questions concerning this matter 
please address them to this office. 
Yours very truly, 
Robert L. Moody 
RLM:cjc 
Enclosure 
TArLOR, MOODY & THORNE, P.O. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
FORMERLY 
THOMAS S TAYLOR CHRISTENSEN. TAYLOR & MOODY 
ROBERT L MOODY
 2n<> NORTH CANYON ROAD 
D EUGENE THORNE COUNTRY CLUB COURT „ ,
 n 
• • • TELEPHONE 
of Counsel PO BOX 1466 (801)373-2721 
KAY ALDR1CH LINDSAY PROVO. UTAH 8460* FAX (801) 375-6293 
July 21, 1989 
LARAY COMPANY, INC, 
P.O. Box 462 
LaHabra, CA 90631 
RE: Kamdar & Company vs. Laray Company, Inc. 
Gentlemen: 
Enclosed is Kamdar & Company's billing showing a credit 
of your recent payment and the current unpaid balance. Demand is 
hereby made upon you to take care of this matter within thirty 
(30) days to avoid the necessity of this being referred to 
correspondent counsel for legal proceedings. 
Should you have questions concerning this matter please 
address them to this office. 
Yours very truly, 
Robert L. Moody & 
Attorney at Law 
RLM:jsp 
Enclosure 
AUG 4 1989 
linG 
P.O. BOX 462 • LA HABRA. CA 90631 
July 25, 1989 
Robert L. Moody 
Taylor, Moody & Thorne, PC 
2525 North Canyon Rd. 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Refrence: Kamdar Company vs Laray Company, Inc. i ' \jf* 
Your letter dated July 21, 1989 V^ n/1 ^ Q o 
Mr* Moody: 
With respect to the matter at contest, it is our position that a 
compromise agreement be once again considered. It is our contention 
that there was a vast disparity between the nature of services rendered 
and the corresponding fees charged by Mr. Kamdar. We offer as evidence 
the dearth of documentation and product provided to us for Mr. Kamdar's 
effort during the billing period. As a point of refrence, under the 
exact parallel circumstances, our present accounting services, which 
are provided by a Certified Public Accountant, are nowhere near the 
level of cost imposed by Mr. Kamdar. 
Enclosed is our original letter of compromise for which a corres-
ponding payment and negotition of such payment has been accomplishedc 
If the above terms are not acceptable to your client we suggest that 
whatever legal remedies may incur under the circumstances be pursued. 
Additionally, for your files, there is an interplay between the 
subject billing for professional services and a promissory demand note 
due to the principal owner of our Company. To avoid a compromise of our 
position with respect to this note, (face value $15,000), we ask an 
offset to our obligation to that of your clients. 
Very truly yours, // 
President 
rl/RB 
Exhibit "E" 
1801 EAST LAMBERT RD . LA HABRA, CALIFORNIA 
THOMAS S TAYLOR 
ROBERT L MOODY 
D EUGENE THORN'E 
of Counsel 
KAY ALDR1CH LINDSAY 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
FORMFRLY 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
2525 NORTH CANYON ROAD 
COUNTRY CLUB COURT 
P O BOX 1466 
PROVO. UTAH 8460* 
TELEPHONE 
(801) 373-2721 
FAX (801) 375-6293 
A u g u s t 1 6 , 1989 
Ray Boal, Jr., President 
LaRay Company, Inc. 
P.O. Box 462 
La Habra, CA 90631 
re: Kamdar v. LaRay Company, Inc. 
Dear Mr. Boal: 
Thank you for your letter of July 25, 1989, together 
with a copy of your letter addressed to Kamdar & Company, dated 
May 12, 1989. 
As you can appreciate it is difficult for either myself 
or Mr. Kamdar to compare what you're presently paying a CPA to 
what you previously paid Kamdar & Company. We have no way of 
knowing what the CPA is doing at the present time but we do know 
what Mr. Kamdar did in the past and we do know that for many 
he provided services and was paid the fees and it is only 
the payments to him. We 
years 
after the fact that you want to adjust 
do not think that that is appropriate. 
>r\i 
Referring to your recap of the accounting services 
rendered in your letter dated May 12, 1989, you have failed to 
include the 1986-1987 preparation of corporate tax returns in the 
sum of $5,580.00 and you have failed to include the 1986-1987 
banK reporting services which totalled $4,052.00. If you would 
have included those figures your total would have been 
$23,921.00. It is my opinion that contractually you're obligated 
in this amount. 
We appreciate the spirit of your willingness to try and 
resolve this matter as set forth in your letter of July 25, 1989, 
and in that same spirit it is our suggestion that the matter be 
compromised as follows: 
(a) That 
Kamdar owes your Company. 
you offset the $15,000.00 note Mr 
Exhibit "F 
Ray Boal, Jr., President 
LaRay Company, Inc. 
August 16, 1989 
Page 2 
(b) That you pay Mr. Kamdar $6,600.00 in monthly 
payments of $2,200.00 per month over the next three months. 
Your considering this matter and prompt reply will be 
appreciated. 
Yours very truly, 
RLM:cjc 
cc: Kamdar & Company 
Exhibit D 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******** 
KAMDAR &COMPANY, Case No. 900400079 
Plaintiff, DECISION 
vs. 
LARAY COMPANY INC., et al, 
Defendant. 
******** 
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's 
Request for a Ruling on defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The 
Court assumes that Mr. Walker is intending the Request as a 
Notice to Submit for a Decision under Rule 4-501(1)(d) rather 
than the cited 4-501(e). The Court, having considered the the 
Motion, accompanying memoranda, and affidavits enters the 
following: 
DECISION 
Defendants contend that this Court has no personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants. The record establishes that 
the defendants have an 18 year relationship with the plaintiff 
and that for almost all of that time the plaintiff has resided 
in Utah and has performed accounting and other financial 
services for the defendants in Utah. 
However, the record also clearly indicates that the 
agreement to have plaintiff render accounting and financial 
services for the Laray Company, Inc. was entered into in 
California. Furthermore, the defendants do no business in 
Utah. The only contact that any of the defendants have with 
this State is the fact that their accountant works here. There 
is no evidence that the defendants sought out a Utah accountant 
to do their financing. Rather, the accountant moved to Utah 
after the contract was made. 
This Court finds that the nature and quality of the 
defendants' activities relative to the State of Utah are not of 
the kind that would subject them to personal jurisdiction 
(specific or general). Plaintiff's reference to Utah Code 
78-27-23(2) is inapposite as is its reliance on Synergetics v. 
Marathon Ranching Co.. 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985). Defendants 
have never purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the State of Utah. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby grants 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
Mr. Jackson is to prepare an Order consistent with 
this decision. 
DATED, in Provo, this /2 day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
"GEORGE E^BALLIF, JUDG 
cc: Jeffery Walker 
Kevin Jackson 
Exhibit E 
W KEVIN JACKSON (1640) 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2379 
(8100 531-6600 
MARK J. PERRIZO 
WILSON, WILSON & PERRIZO 
Attorney for Defendant 
10901 Paramount Blvd. 
Downey, CA 90241 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Ufahtounty Stati 
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUCICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
KAMDAR & COMPANY 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND 
BOAL: AND JAMES A. BOAL, JR., 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
Civil NMo. 90-040-0079 
Judge Ballif 
ooOoo 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs 
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the Defendants having 
been duly called on for hearing before the Court pursuant to 
Rule 4-501(1)(d), and the Court having considered the 
affidavits and memorandums of points and authorities submitted 
by each of the parties and for reasons more fully set forth in 
the decision of this Court dated the 12th day of July, 1990, 
and upon motion of the Defendants it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff's Complaint against each of the 
Defendants is hereby dismissed due to the lack of personal 
jurisdiction over the named Defendants, 
2. Th Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is 
hereby granted, without prejudice. 
DATED t h i s / ^f day of <2j&SfcJJ90. 
£6<.*.^6.r*e. 
Judge Georpp E. Ballif 
\bpr6\Nbd as to Form 
jnw 337/pb 
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